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Abstract 
The Schumpeterian and neo-schumpeterian theories represent pillars on which the subject of 
innovation developed and gained expression. Moreover, innovation is an independent area both 
in national and international congresses. The objective of this essay is to investigate – from two 
criteria of delimitation (Popper and Lakatos) – the scientificity of innovation theory. Innovation 
is analyzed from three macro themes: (i) the neoclassical current of economic theory; (ii) the 
introduction of innovation theory and reviews of the more recent Schumpeter manuscripts; (iii) 
the contributions brought by the neo-chumpeterian innovation current. In concluding that the 
subject of innovation as analyzed meets the criteria listed to categorize the scientificity according 
to Popper and Lakatos, implications for the field of innovation studies are discussed, such as the 
construction/transmission of knowledge, the escape from “common sense”, and the use of the 
“method” as a resource for building scientific knowledge.
Keywords: Innovation; Economic theory; Criteria for Scientific Demarcation; Schumpeter; 
Falsificationism; Research Programs.
CONTRIBUCIONES DE LA FILOSOFÍA DE LA CIENCIA, EN LA 
PERSPECTIVA DE POPPER Y LAKATOS, PARA EL ESTUDIO DE 
LA INNOVACIÓN: UN ANÁLISIS DE LAS TEORÍAS NEOCLÁSICA 
SCHUMPETERIANA Y NEO-SCHUMPETERIANA
Resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es investigar –a partir de dos criterios de delimitación (Popper y Laka-
tos) – la cientificidad de la teoría de la innovación. La innovación se analiza a partir de tres temas 
macro: (i) la corriente neoclásica de la teoría económica; (ii) la introducción de la teoría de la inno-
vación y los manuscritos más recientes de Schumpeter; y (iii) las contribuciones aportadas por la 
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corriente neo-chumpeteriana de la innovación. Se concluye que el tema de la innovación responde 
a los criterios para categorizar la cientificidad, encontrándose que esto tiene implicaciones en el 
campo de los estudios sobre el tema en aspectos como: la construcción / transmisión del cono-
cimiento, la evasión del “sentido común”, y el uso del “método” como recurso para construir el 
conocimiento científico.
Palabras clave: Innovación; Teoría económica; Criterios de cientificidad; Schumpeter; Falsa-
cionismo; Programas de investigación científica.
CONTRIBUIÇÕES DA FILOSOFIA DA CIÊNCIA, NA PERSPECTIVA 
DE POPPER E LAKATOS, PARA O ESTUDO DA INOVAÇÃO: UMA 
ANÁLISE DAS TEORIAS NEOCLÁSSICA SCHUMPETERIANA E 
NEO-SCHUMPETERIANA
Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é pesquisar – a partir de dois critérios de delimitação (Popper e Lakatos) 
– a cientificidade da teoria da inovação. Analisa-se a inovação a partir de três temas macro: (i) a 
corrente neoclássica da teoria econômica; (ii) a introdução da teoria da inovação e dos manuscritos 
mais recentes de Schumpeter; e (iii) as contribuições da corrente neo-chumpeteriana da inovação. 
Conclui-se que o tema da inovação responde aos critérios para categorizar a cientificidade, e que 
isto tem implicações no campo dos estudos sobre o tema em aspectos como: a construção / trans-
missão do conhecimento, a evasão do "sentido comum", e o uso do "método" como recurso para 
construir o conhecimento científico.
Palavras chave: Inovação; Teoria econômica; Critérios de cientificidade; Schumpeter; Falsa-
cionismo; Programas de investigação científica.
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1. Introduction
The theme of innovation has been forming in re-
cent times as of importance for the analysis of the 
economic evolution of society (Fagerberg, 2004; 
Baregheh, Rowley & Sambrook, 2009), as it ties 
to the performance of organizations and econom-
ic growth of a country (Nelson, 2006). For these 
reasons, the relevance of the theme in the exact 
sciences and applied social sciences is recognized, 
with emphasis on the economy and administration.
The interest in the theme emerged from the writ-
ings of Schumpeter (1982) and brought the possibil-
ity of discussing innovation in interface with other 
fronts, in a range of business enterprises, as well 
as in disciplines in academia (Baregheh, Rowley & 
Sambrook, 2009).
Other evidence on the representativeness of the 
topic can be illustrated by the number of books in 
the “best management practices” model, in which 
one of the main recommendations is the need for 
the company to innovate to ensure its profitability, 
win slices of market, differentiate from its competi-
tors and reduce costs. These are publications of a 
prescriptive nature, originated following the logic of 
induction, along the lines of “it worked well in my 
company, so it may work well on yours too” (De 
Mattos, 2003; 2009).
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The purpose of this study is to investigate – from 
two criteria of demarcation (Karl Popper and Imre 
Lakatos) – the scientificity of innovation in Schum-
peterian and neo-schumpeterian perspective. Inno-
vation is analyzed from three conceptual milestones: 
(a) the current of neoclassical economic theory; (b) 
the introduction of innovation theory and reviews of 
the last Schumpeter manuscripts; (c) the unfolding 
of the theory, entitled neo-schumpeterian current.
Considering that this work has already begun in oth-
er fields of study in Administration (Albach, 1993; 
De Mattos, 2009) it is hoped that with this essay 
we can initiate the discussion in the field of inno-
vation, (i) contributing to the strengthening of the 
bases of philosophy of science bases of these two 
authors (Popper and Lakatos); (ii) discussing and 
bringing improvements both to the reflection and 
understanding of the sub-area of innovation per se; 
(iii) and complementing a discussion already begun 
on how much administration (and the sub-areas that 
compose it) can or cannot be considered a science.
In the light of the above considerations, this paper 
begins by discussing the contributions of Karl Pop-
per and Imre Lakatos to the philosophy of science, 
as well as the notes of their respective criteria of 
scientific demarcation. In the sequence, the macro-
themes of innovation are presented and an analysis 
is carried out regarding its scientificity. Lastly, the 
final considerations are presented.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1.	Karl	Popper	and	falsificationism
Popper is among the most influential philosophers 
of science of the twentieth century. Its counterposi-
tion to Hume’s induction, in which the number of 
consecutive confirmatory observations on a particu-
lar phenomenon would be sufficient condition for 
proposing a universal theory, has made the logic of 
scientific research not revolve around verifying the 
veracity of theories and laws, but in the verification 
of its falsifiability (Persson, 2016). Popper argues 
that it would be impossible to confirm that a law or 
theory would be true, even if its repetition would 
lead one to believe it. The scientist should then be 
guided by the denial of what was being observed. 
This perspective shift brought a reversal in the way 
of doing science (Popper, 1975).
This change responds the need for standard and sys-
tematic scientific methods so that the evolution of 
science could be accepted and confronted in a coher-
ence way. Thus, Popper’s writings influenced several 
scholars (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1979) and, in his 
words, “no test statement would justify the assertion 
that a universal explanatory theory is true” (Popper 
1975, p.18). Popper, then, defends the hypotheti-
cal deductive method for the execution of theoreti-
cal work, which consists of testing laws or theories 
in order to try to falsify it. However, for this to be 
possible, it is important that general law, hypothesis, 
conjecture or supposition be falsifiable, in order that 
it must be clear and non-tautological (Popper, 1975).
The higher the numbers of unproven tests of a the-
ory, the greater its degree of corroboration, making 
the theory in question be considered strong. How-
ever, all statements are provisional, and it can’t be 
claim that such a theory will last forever. Thus, more 
falsification tests will continue to be made. To illus-
trate, Popper uses Darwinism with metaphor (Pers-
son, 2016, p.3):
Organisms have expectations, if frustrated they die, 
unlike the cientists whose hypothesis dies in their 
stead. And just as a species cannot be assured of an 
infinite life, a scientific theory can never once and 
for all be verified, but its reliability is provisional.
According the concept of ‘corroboration’ of a theo-
ry established by Popper (1975), in a certain period 
‘t’, the following points are regarded: (a) the way in 
which the theory solves the problem; (B) the degree 
of testability ( the theory must be necessarily tested); 
(C) the rigor of the tests that the theory suffered (the 
more severe the tests, the more robust the theory); 
(D) how the theory reacted to the tests. After assess-
ing those criteria, the theory is chosen - among its 
rivals - because it has a greater “degree of corrobo-
ration” than the others (Collodel, 2016).
However, the ideas defended by Popper had also 
evolved, seeking to improve the defined concepts 
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and fill the gaps. Lakatos & Musgrave (1979), admit-
tedly adept at Popper’s conceptions, had presented 
a series of concepts that guided the discussion of 
Popper’s falsificationism, the progress of science, 
and its demarcation criteria. Among the concepts 
presented, we can highlight:
• Dogmatic falsificationism: admits the fallibility 
of all scientific theories without qualification, 
but maintains an infallible empirical basis (the-
ories are judged from empirical evidence). In 
this perspective, the advance of science would 
happen on the basis of successive refutations 
of theories through the observation of concrete 
facts;
• Methodological falsificationism: the falsification-
ist understands that in the scientist’s experimen-
tal techniques fallible theories are involved, in 
light of which he interprets the facts. This type 
of falsificationism, according to Lakatos and 
Musgrave (1979, p. 133) “opens new avenues 
for criticism: a much greater number of theo-
ries can be described as” scientific. “The ques-
tion that reverberates here is that if the theory 
should not be discarded on the first time it is 
falsified, when it should be? Thus, “The falsifica-
tionist finds himself in a serious situation when it 
comes time to decide where to draw the bound-
aries” (Lakatos & Musgrave 1979, 135);
• Sophisticated falsificationism: considered a 
theoretical advance in relation to the previous 
item, it emphasizes the criteria of demarcation 
that will serve to classify a theory as scientific. 
The theory is scientific when it has a surplus 
of empirical content corroborated in relation to 
the theory that precedes it.
The formulation of research problems, according to 
Chalmers (1993), is related to the study of phenom-
ena that should be understood from the formulation 
of hypotheses, which will be reviewed and tested. 
If a hypothesis remains successful for a long period 
of time and - eventually - becomes falsified, a new 
research problem arises. This shift, between one 
problem and another illustrates the advances of sci-
ence. From the new problem, new hypotheses will 
be needed, and these will be retested. It is assumed, 
then, that science advances through successive at-
tempts to explain concrete phenomena based on 
particular hypotheses (Chalmers, 1993). In addi-
tion, some requirements are necessary so that the 
hypotheses, in addition to being falsifiable, have the 
potential to evolve the research: (A) Based on Theo-
ries; (B) Have clarity and precision; (C) The ampli-
tude level of the statement, considering that the best 
theory, behind the hypothesis, is one that presents 
more precise and broad statements about specific 
phenomena, and still resists falsification.
2.2. Imre Lakatos and the research programs
Lakatos is known for presenting a proposal to ex-
pand the scope of scientific research, extending the 
unit of analysis of an isolated scientific theory for 
the study of research programs, which, according 
to him, would be composed of a nucleus, hypoth-
eses and heuristics. Although Lakatos is an follower 
of Popper’s conceptions, the epistemological traits 
of the work of the philosopher of science Thomas 
Kuhn are observed in his reasoning, resembling the 
concept of paradigm breakdown (Kuhn, 2003):
For the sophisticated (falsificationist), a scientific 
theory T will only be falsified if another theory T 
‘has been proposed with the following characteris-
tics: (1) T’ presents an excess of empirical content 
with respect to T; That is, it provides for new facts, 
ie facts unlikely to be enlightened or even prohibited 
by T; (2) T ‘explains the previous success of T, that 
is, all unrefutted content of T is included (within the 
limits of observational error) in the contents of T’; 
And (3) part of the excessive T ‘content is corrobo-
rated (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1979, p.142).
It is observed that the analysis fails in focus a se-
quence of isolated theories and turns its focus to 
the examination of a series of theories (T, T ‘, T “). 
According to this approach, the empirical criterion 
changes from agreement with the facts observed 
and is replaced by a better theory, referring to the 
one that presents new information, when com-
pared with the previous theory, so that at least part 
of the informational surplus be corroborated (Col-
lodel, 2016). This is the idea defended by Kuhn, 
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the difference proposed by Lakatos consists in the 
establishment of certain requirements attributed to 
the sets of theories, called by him of research pro-
grammes, in order to lead the belief that this substi-
tution is not done in an unsystematic and irrational 
way. These criteria were therefore aimed at over-
coming the weaknesses of the Kuhnian paradigm 
shift (García Jiménez, 2008).
Regarding Lakatos’ observations on the differences 
between naive and sophisticated methodological fal-
sificationists, it is possible to observe that one of the 
relevant points of the latter is to replace the concept 
of a theory with a series of theories. In the words of 
Lakatos and Musgrave (1979, p. 161), “it is a suc-
cession of theories and not an isolated theory that is 
evaluated as scientific or pseudo-scientific.” The con-
tinuity and the set of articulated / connected concepts 
between theories (precursors and successors) helps to 
compose what is called “research programmes”.
The research programme consists of methodologi-
cal rules that guide researchers about which re-
search paths need to be avoided (negative heuristics) 
and those that should be addressed (positive heuris-
tics). It represents a structure formed by an irreduc-
ible nucleus of basic hypotheses of the theories that 
compose it, nucleus that is protected by a belt of 
auxiliary hypotheses and by the heuristics. The heu-
ristic principle consists in discouraging the work on 
incompatible scientific theories and stimulating the 
work with auxiliary hypotheses (Silva, 2009).
Positive heuristics refer to an articulated set of sug-
gestions on how to change and develop the “re-
futed variants” of the research programme and how 
to modify and improve the protective belt, that is, 
it points to researchers as the irreducible core of 
a research Program must be completed. Negative 
heuristics are the auxiliary hypotheses formulated to 
solve the anomalies and initial conditions that form 
the “protective belt” of the program. In this case, 
falsifiability can never overthrow the nucleus, but 
only in some auxiliary hypothesis that forms part of 
the protective belt (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1979).
The evaluation of the research programmes pro-
gressive when the changes in the auxiliary hypoth-
eses that compose the protection belt give origin 
to the prediction of new facts.A program is degen-
erative when the adjustments made in the protec-
tion belt do not present the possibility of predicting 
a new fact, or the forecast is not confirmed. Ac-
cording to Lakatos and Musgrave (1979, p.164), 
“we only need to see, at least once in a while, that 
the increase in content has been corroborated ret-
rospectively”. This citation indicates a less severe 
and more flexible criterion (as regards the deadline, 
since it is not an immediate conclusion) for the 
evaluation of the programs. In this context, scien-
tific revolutions occur if there are two rival research 
programmes and one of them progresses while the 
other degenerates, leading the researchers to opt 
for the progressive program. The following are the 
demarcation criteria in this paper (Table 1):
Table 1. Criteria of scientific demarcation of Popper 
(1975) and Lakatos & Musgrave (1979)
Criteria
Popper
Presentation of Scientific Problems
Presentation of Problems related to Theories
Presence of Hypotheses
Test of Theories
Promotion to criticism
Lakatos
Presence of related theories that form a guiding research 
program
The ability of the research program to predict new facts
Source: prepared by the authors based on the references cited 
above
2.3. Analysis of Science in the Social Sciences Field
Although the scientific demarcation criteria of Pop-
per and Lakatos are widely accepted, both authors 
were not exempt from harsh criticism, which, after 
all, is a salutary practice for the development of sci-
ence. A first caveat to be made was with regard to 
what was understood by the authors as a science, 
for many of their assumptions seemed essentially 
directed to the field of natural sciences, which was 
strongly denied by Popper. However, the fact that 
Popper had linked falsificationism to empirical tests 
of hypotheses related to concrete facts, made the 
Social Sciences seem to be relegated to the back-
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ground. Lakatos has attempted to overcome this 
weakness by arguing that empirical tests of reality 
could not be the only counterfeit method, since 
once counterfeiting was not proven, this would not 
automatically imply acceptance of theory, hypothe-
sis, or assumption, for the error could be in the own 
method used. For Lakatos, the best solution would 
be to resort to logic, in which through the analysis 
of propositions, falsification could be found and this 
method would cover the previous one proposed by 
Popper (Silva, 2009).
Thus, many areas of knowledge in the social sciences 
field have passed (and still pass) by debates whose 
focus is to understand whether such areas may or 
may not be considered scientific, given the classical 
demarcation criteria. In the field of Administration, 
for example, there are discussions about what has 
been produced, about the epistemological coherence 
of research and of its scientific nature. Another point 
of this analysis lies in the fact that the Administration 
uses research methods and techniques from other ar-
eas of knowledge (Bunge, 1980). Albach (1993) ad-
dresses issues that prevent the Administration from 
being considered a science and points out the require-
ments that could make it a scientific area: revision of 
the types of enunciation and selection of objects of 
study, validity, objectivity and the possibility of (re) 
application by third parties. Some other studies that 
came to debate the theme are listed in table 2:
Table 2. Synthesis of studies that address the scientificity of Administration
Tittle / author (s) Objective Results
Management as practice-oriented science
(Johann & Duclós, 2013)
Discuss the feasibility of conceptualizing 
Administration as a science.
It was not possible to claim the hypothesis that Admin-
istration is a science.
Is the Administration a science? Episte-
mological reflections on his scientificity 
(Damke, Walter & da Silva, 2010)
It discusses the scientificity of the Admin-
istration.
It was concluded that Administration, as a theory of 
knowledge, can be considered a science before the 
possibility of distorting the existing studies, according 
to Popper´s sophisticated falsificationism theory; to 
meet the assumptions of Kuhn’s paradigmatic science, 
although there is no consensus about the stage that the 
field is.
 The scientificity of
Administration in debate (Taffarel & da Silva, 
2015)
The main arguments regarding the recog-
nition of scientificity in Administration are 
presented with the objective of deepening 
the discussions and clarifying the possible 
contradictions.
Reasons for some authors not to recognize the scienti-
ficity of Administration: (a) the area consists of only an 
application of other sciences; (B) its theories are vague 
and haslittle applicability; (C) its scholarship is directed 
only at practice. Reasons for the area to be considered a 
science: it is an area based on the philosophy of science 
and the criteria of scientific demarcation.
Administration: reflections on ts scientificity
(Dos Reis, Colla & Cruz, 2013)
Investigate what needs to be taken into ac-
count in order for Administration to be con-
sidered a science.
It is suggested that the current stage is of a near-science 
or pre-science.
Rethingking Administration as a science: a 
theoretical essay (Gomes et al., 2013)
Rethinking Social Sciences and especially 
Administration as a scientific field.
It can be said that Administration is a science, and must 
enjoy the same status of Natural Sciences.
A critical-epistemological analysis of Ad-
ministration: construction, reconstruction 
and deconstruction? (Martins, Rocha & 
Cruz, 2011)
Answer if Administration is a science. One can not say that there is a proper theory of admin-
istrative knowledge, in Kuhn´s paradigmatic sense or in 
the hard core following Lakatos, in which case, it can not 
be considered a science.
Source: Prepared by the authors based on literature review
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From the studies cited, it is perceived that the de-
bate still seems far from a consensus and this is not 
something restricted to the field of Administration. 
In Economics, the discussion about its scientific na-
ture and the need to follow a standard of norms is 
not very different either. Like most fields of knowl-
edge, there is a concern with standardization in or-
der to have valid results as is expected of a science 
field. However, some authors criticize this exacer-
bated concern, emphasizing that Economics should 
prioritize other issues (Boldyrev, 2012, p.3):
There are authors who (tend to) analy-
se economics in order to produce a co-
herent conceptual model of scientific 
practice and amend the general philo-
sophical ideas of scientific knowledge, 
causality etc., and the authors who are 
primarily interested in how economics 
is embedded in the social world and in-
fluences it.
Thus, some authors argue that, because Economics 
is a field of social knowledge, external philosophical 
questions should be relegated to the background. 
Boldyrev (2012, p. 5) goes on to make an even 
more compelling criticism:
Whenever one advances a normative ac-
count (i.e. states how science should pro-
ceed to achieve the best results), one impli-
citly presupposes that one in fact posses-
ses these results. The same applies to the 
external criterion of truthfulness: if one 
can judge what is true, it means that the 
truth has been found and that one does 
not need to continue searching. Of course, 
one must break this familiar circle […]
In any case, there is still no accepted understand-
ing in the field of economics as to what would be 
the correct way to set aside external philosophical 
norms. For the time being, the criteria of Popper 
and Lakatos are still accepted by the great major-
ity of scientific communities, since it still argues the 
need to define directions that are common to all 
(Silva, 2009).
With respect to the classical theories of innovation, 
in view of its trajectory, some of its properties also 
fit into the frameworks of scientificity analysis pro-
posed by the classical theoreticians of the philoso-
phy of science studied here: Popper and Lakatos. 
The next sections proposed macro-themes of inno-
vation in the light of contributions from the above-
mentioned authors, seeking - where possible - inter-
preting them.
3. Macro Themes
3.1. Historical context and the neoclassical 
theory
The idea of circular flow, predominant in the peri-
ods prior to Schumpeter, belongs to the current of 
thought of the neoclassical theory. Approximately 
in the mid-nineteenth century, not only England, 
but much of the European continent was under-
going a phase of maturation and evolution of its 
industrialization process. At this stage, known as 
the “Second Industrial Revolution”, the companies 
were characterized as a single plant firm, special-
ized in a narrow range of activities (Tigre, 1998; 
2006).
Despite the innumerable implications of using in-
novations in the productive sphere, the prevailing 
theory still regarded technology as exogenous. The 
industrial dynamics of this period constituted the 
reference for the development of the neoclassical 
theory of (nearly) perfect competition and economic 
development. Some points, taken as premises of 
the theory (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2002), reinforced 
the concept of linearity in economic development 
and circular flow.
Considering Walrasian general equilibrium theory, 
one of the first attempts by neoclassical economists 
to explain the dynamics of supply, demand and 
price formation for a complete economy, Weintraub 
(1988) identified what could be considered the irre-
ducible nucleus of this specific theory, in addition to 
the positive heuristics and the negative heuristics, 
which according to Lakatos could form a research 
program, which can be verified in Table 3:
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Table 3. Suggestion of composition of the research program of neoclassical microeconomic theory
The hard nucleus assumptions
HC1. There are economic agents;
HC2. Agents have preferences over outcomes;
HC3. Agents independently optimize subject to constraints; 
HC4. Choices are made in interrelated markets;
HC5. Agents have full relevant knowledge;
HC6. Observable economic outcomes are coordinated, so they must be discussed with reference to equi-
librium theories.
Positive heuristics
PH1. Go forth and construct theories in which economic agents optimize;
PH2. Build theories that make predictions about changes in equilibrium states;
Negative heuristics
NH1. Do not build theories in which irrational behavior plays any role;
NH2. Do not build theories in which equilibrium has no meaning;
NH3. Do not test hard core propositions.
Source: Weintraub (1988, pp. 166-167).
Under these conditions, the absence of the agent 
that promotes innovation can be observed (Schum-
peter, 1982), given the admission of hypotheses 
HC1, HC2, HC3, HC4, HC5 e HC6. According to 
Martini (2014: 8), “empirical evidence would test 
the possibilities of applying the general equilib-
rium, but not its basic hypotheses”. Considering 
the lakatosian logic, while this irreducible nucleus 
remains intact, the research program remains valid. 
For the progress of economics, as a science, the 
researcher must be guided by heuristics. When 
changes occur in the auxiliary hypotheses (heuris-
tics) capable of predicting new facts, Lakatos says 
that the program is progressive. 
The microeconomic foundations highlighted – at the 
time – could be transplanted into the macro sphere. 
The first neoclassical author explaining macroeco-
nomic growth was Solow (1956). In his model, he 
focuses on the causes of growth per capita: popula-
tion growth would reduce the balance, savings would 
enable the increase of growth per capita, but not 
economic development as a whole. The only way 
to enable sustainable growth, both per capita and 
total, would be technological development, which 
would take place exogenously (Solow, 1956). It is 
valid to assert, then, that economic growth could 
only occur through the natural growth of the popu-
lation and of aggregated savings, should a technol-
ogy foreign to the industries not emerge. 
From the perspective of Popper’s (1975) criteria, it 
is observed that the Walrasian general equilibrium 
theory, one of the foundations of classical microeco-
nomic theory, has gaps that could not possibly be 
falsified. In addition, the research program showed 
signs of degeneration, also because it could not ex-
plain new facts (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1979). Even 
so, neoclassical theory remained the main explana-
tion for economic growth in the absence of a new 
theory / new research program. In this respect, it 
can be deduced that there is some convergence be-
tween the thinking of the authors used in this essay, 
in the sense that the abandonment of the theory / 
program can only occur when another theory / pro-
gram demonstrates greater corroboration power.
3.1.1. Breakup of the circular flow 
At the heart of economic neoclassical thinking, 
marked by the functionalist view of its epistemologi-
cal paradigm, were the technicist and traditionalist 
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visions. This functionalist epistemological paradigm 
posited neoclassical perspective as a super-simpli-
fication of reality. Thus the more dynamic and or-
ganic visions of organizations as open systems in 
constant interaction with the surrounding environ-
ment and interacting with other already implanted 
organizations seem simply non-existant. This inter-
pretive limitation was latent, as Winter & Nelson 
(1982, p. 147) point out when stating that “[...] the 
way formal economic theory was developing at the 
beginning of the century tended to exclude inter-
est in innovation and economic development “, fo-
cusing only on solutions and explanations of static 
economic problems. Sraffa (1988) posed solid ques-
tions about neoclassical theory, observing in some 
industrial configurations the presence of differenti-
ated products, economies of scale, and consequent-
ly individual decreasing costs.
The hypothesis raised by Schumpeter is that every 
development process rests on a preceding evolu-
tion, based on spontaneous and non-linear altera-
tions that unbalance the state of the existing flow. 
This hypothesis contained in itself a content of cor-
roboration superior to neoclassical theory (Popper, 
1975). Lekachman (1973, p. 365) interpreting 
Schumpeter’s work, stated that economic progress 
and wars, revolutions and discoveries of gold could 
cause changes in the invariable course of circular 
flow, but “the dynamizing agent of the economic 
cycle was innovation”.
Briefly, the ruptures of the circular flow were, in the 
first instance, authored by the innovative entrepre-
neur who identified opportunities that emerged in 
the economic environment and undertook them. 
Therefore, the flow is not static, it is involved in a 
dynamic process of evolution. It is observed that 
the neoclassical theory of circular flow has been re-
placed by the theory that the flow is neither linear 
nor circular, it is dynamic and has, at times, abrupt 
ruptures that extend its reach (with respect to eco-
nomic productivity, and also about uncertainty and 
imbalance, for example with regard to unemploy-
ment) through the introduction of one of the forms 
of innovation (Schumpeter, 1982). It is important 
to note that these abrupt changes occur under cer-
tain circumstances and at some times, most likely 
after long periods of incremental change. However, 
the great legacy here is to admit that these abrupt 
changes also occur and that development can not 
be regarded as uniquely linear. Such changes in per-
spectives evidence the substitution of the theory T 
by T’ (Popper, 1975).
3.2. Schumpeterian innovation theory
Innovation is understood, in essence, as the intro-
duction of new combinations of products or eco-
nomically viable processes (Schumpeter, 1982), as 
well as the dynamising mechanism of the economic 
cycle (Lekachman, 1973). Regarding the definition 
of the Kotsemir innovation concept, Abroskin and 
Meissner add:
Innovation is related to changes (on lar-
ge (radical) or small (incremental) scales) 
that have a significant impact on struc-
tural changes in individual industries 
and market segments. In this approach, 
new production methods are not ne-
cessarily based on new scientific disco-
veries. (Kotsemir, Abroskin & Meissner, 
2013, p.4)
In this way, not only the introduction of new tech-
nologies will motivate the entrepreneur to innovate, 
but also the search for solutions or other incremen-
tal improvements.
Although the new combinations may come from 
firms that control the production process, Schum-
peter (1982) argues that it is often the new firms 
that disrupt the existing models, influencing not 
only economic but also social discontinuities. 
From the consolidation of Schumpeter’s propos-
als, it is possible to replace the neoclassical re-
search program with the research program based 
on innovation. The new assumptions would then 
be (Table 4):
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Table 4. New search program
The hard nucleus suppositions
HC1: Technology is not exogenous to the firm;
HC2: Innovation can take place inside the firm; 
HC3: Innovation involves risks and uncertainties;
HC4: To be an innovation, the product / service or process must be economically / commercially viable;
HC5: Innovation allows product differentiation;
HC6: Innovation is not a static but a dynamic process; 
HC7: Innovation can lead to productivity gains;
HC8: Innovation can generate a temporary monopoly for the firm, enabling it to earn monopoly profits for 
a given period.
Positive heuristics
PH1. Work on theories by considering that organizations take risks to get into privileged positions in certain 
markets;
PH2. Work with theories that consider market balance as something temporary and fragile;
Negative heuristics NH1. Do not work with theories that consider the market as static.
Source: Based on the premises and definitions of Schumpeterian Innovation Theory (Schumpeter, 1982)
The hard nucleus assumptions of Schumpeter’s 
Theory of Innovation correspond to the immutable 
aspect of the theory, hence the nucleus designation 
and the need for it to be protected by heuristics. Un-
like the Neoclassical Theory, technology no longer 
appears in this theory as something so exogenous 
to the company. From this theory, it is understood 
that the technology is developed by the company as 
well, which gives it a greater capacity for innovation 
(at that time the paradigm of open innovation was 
not yet used). Further assumptions reflect the im-
portance that innovation can have for companies, 
emphasizing its benefits, as well as the emphasis on 
the risks involved in the innovation process. Accord-
ing to Schumpeter (1982), the simultaneous and un-
interrupted diffusion and penetration of innovations 
of a technical nature among sectors, evaluated from 
the economic sphere, contributes to the promotion 
of imbalances in the trajectory of economic growth.
3.2.1. Introduction of hypotheses: the role of the 
State and that of large companies
In the article entitled Economic Theory and Entre-
preneurial History, Schumpeter (1982) revisits his 
writings on the subject of innovation. The author 
noted that crediting the innovative capacity of small 
entrepreneurial companies as the exclusive agents 
of revolution in productivity and efficiency of econo-
mies would be a fallacy, since variables such as the 
distance from the country, to the location of the 
company in the technological frontier or its degree 
of financial development affect directly the design 
of structural and macroeconomic policies designed 
to promote growth (Aghion & Festré, 2017). Thus, 
even in free market countries, the structure and 
economic development can influence subsequent 
economic and technological growth, which will 
naturally affect companies. Therefore, these issues 
cannot be considered as the only driving force of 
the innovation process.
However, it is important to note that there is no 
consensus on this argument. There are many stud-
ies (Aghion & Festré, 2017), whose cross-country 
regression finds no relation between state policy 
and economic growth, as well as jumps caused by 
the introduction of innovations. Analyzing the clas-
sical theory of Schumpeterian Innovation from a 
lakatosian perspective, the research program can 
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be considered progressive, since changes in the 
auxiliary hypotheses that make up the protection 
belt gave rise to the prediction of new facts. That 
is to say, themes such as “Role of big companies 
in stimulating innovation” and “Role of the State in 
stimulating innovation”, which were not a priori de-
fined in the basic assumptions of the Schumpeterian 
Innovation Theory, started to be discussed, due the 
evolution of the research program has made this 
debate relevant, demonstrating the potential of the 
program to discuss new developments, as image 1 
demonstrates, the following:
Image 1. Progressive Research Program - Schumpeterian Innovation Theory
Suppositions of the hard nucleus 
(Table 4)
Protective belt  
(formed by heuristics table 4)
Prediction of new facts
Role of Large Enterprises in 
Stimulating Innovation
Role of the State in stimulating 
Innovation
Source: prepared by authors based on Lakatos and Musgrave (1979)
3.3. Neo-Schumpeterian thinking
In Neo-Schumpeterian thought, in addition to the 
evolution of assumptions in the sense of no longer 
crediting innovation to factors essentially exoge-
nous to companies (Neoclassical Theory), there is 
an evolution in relation to Schumpeterian thinking, 
in the sense of recognizing other aspects related to 
the innovation process.
One of the analyzes related to the neo-Schumpe-
terian theory, concerns the idea that there are no 
entrepreneurs or business organizations in isolation: 
both are inserted in a broader context, expanding to 
the notion of systemic reality: innovation is treated 
as a Systemic phenomenon, with a more complex, 
non-linear and interactive approach that allows 
technological evolution in spheres that transcend 
the individual scope of the organization. This sys-
temic notion, in turn, leads to the belief that any 
change in the system, even if only by the action of 
one company, could have repercussion in all others, 
at least in those that are part of the same industry 
(Erixon, 2014).
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The systemic view of Innovation has given way to 
so-called evolutionary economists, also adept at 
Darwin’s conceptions. According this conception, 
companies that were not adapted to the new chal-
lenges of the market, like, for example, the need for 
innovation, would be more likely to disappear from 
the environment, because the system would be in 
charge of selecting the most suitable companies (Er-
ixon, 2014). Differently from the biological criteria, 
in this case companies could adapt if they were ded-
icated to this through investment in knowledge and 
other attributes also necessary for that process of 
change to occur. In this way, external factors (com-
petition, new technologies, market pressure, etc.) 
as well as internal factors (crises and low profits, for 
example), can influence the company to undertake 
this process of change,. Thus, the neo-Schumpete-
rian conception does not advocate environmental 
determinism; on the contrary, the decision to un-
dertake an innovation process depends on the char-
acteristics of the selective environment, which in 
turn is influenced by the technological change itself, 
then introducing the perception of a co- Evolution 
between the technological change and the selective 
environment (Winter & Nelsson, 1982).
Winter & Nelson (1982) use, as an assumption, the 
dynamism of the economic environment, which 
forces business organizations to work in conditions 
of uncertainty and, at the same time, creates the 
need to maximize their choices. This dynamic im-
plies changes in the company’s routines, illustrating 
the evolutionary process that is likely to occur. This 
evolutionary process concerns the way in which 
the company behaves in the industry in which it 
operates. The idea is based on the argument ad-
vocated by the evolutionary economists, which is 
to say that the companies that most respond to 
market demands and the influences of the system 
will be better able to survive. As discussed earlier, 
this is not deterministic since any firm may decide 
to try to participate in the adaptive process, pro-
vided it is willing to invest and endure the inherent 
risks presents in the process. In addition to Dar-
win’s conceptions, another assumption present in 
neo-Schumpeterian theory is the limited rationality 
(Simon, 1965), which concerns the limitations of 
individuals and companies in the decision-making 
process. That is, the neo-Schumpeterian theory as-
sert that there is no perfect knowledge about eco-
nomic structure and access to information does not 
occur uniformly either. These differences should be 
evaluated by companies as they influence the risks 
inherent in innovation processes.
Another relevant contribution to the neo-schum-
peterian current is given by Dosi (2006). The au-
thor presents a series of criticisms of the classic 
approaches to the emergence of innovation, es-
pecially about the linearity (or unidirectionality) of 
the scientific explanations concerning the innova-
tive process, particularly those that assume that 
the market is determinant for the emergence of 
these innovations. The alternative proposal of in-
terpretation of Dosi (2006) starts from the under-
standing of the current technological paradigms, 
which in turn, were not consolidated exclusively 
by any of the two approaches above, but by the 
role played by economic and institutional factors. 
In addition to the discussion about what motivates 
the emergence of the innovation process and how 
it develops or how it affects economic growth, 
Dosi, Fagiolo & Roventini (2010) point out the 
problems that this type of growth may cause. 
For these authors, economic growth can not be 
maintained exclusively by a “Schumpeterian” mo-
tor, since in general terms the answer is negative, 
especially considering the unemployment rates 
that this ungoverned growth may cause. There-
fore, they argue that this growth must also have 
a “Keynesian” engine, in order to generate a de-
mand for this economic growth, so that growth 
occurs together, in order to have a long-term vi-
sion that can to sustain. One of the forces with 
which this “Keynesian” engine can manifest itself 
is through fiscal public policies.
Thus, due the new ideas considered in the neo-
Schumpeterian view, the main features can be 
summarized in the following points: (A) technolog-
ical change is a fundamental force inshaping the 
patterns of economic transformation; (B) there 
are some dynamic adjustment mechanisms, which 
are radically different in nature from the referred 
allocation mechanisms postulated by the neoclas-
sical theory; (C) there will always be socio-institu-
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tional influences, which can - at times - facilitate 
or delay a given dynamic process of technological 
and structural change, and these acceleration or 
delay effects are related not only to market im-
perfections, but to the very nature of the markets 
themselves.
From the consolidation of the neo-schumpeterian 
proposals, complements and substitutions are sug-
gested to the Schumpeterian research program, 
whose new assumptions added to the hard nucleus 
of the Theory (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1979) would 
be (Table 5):
Table 5. Suppositions complementary to the neo-Schumpterian research program
The additional hard nucleus 
suppositions
HC 1: The rationality of agents is limited;
HC 2: The access and processing of information are costly; 
HC 3: There is no perfect knowledge about the economic structure;
HC 4: Totally planned behavior is not consistent with free will;
HC 5: The idea of maximization ignores the decision-making structure of firms;
HC 6: The agents do not have uniform access to technology, nor the ability to launch innovations; 
HC 7: Technical and institutional changes come to be addressed at the heart of economic analysis and 
policy formation, and no longer as exogenous and residual matters; 
HC 8: Innovation is seen as related to research, discovery, experimentation, development, imitation and 
adoption of new products, new production processes, and even new organizational arrangements;
HC 9: Innovative activities and technological complexity point to the attribution of innovation in favor of 
more formal organizations (universities, research and development laboratories, and large corporations) as 
opposed to innovative individuals;
HC10: In an evolutionary environment, an industry will never achieve neoclassical balance and perfect 
knowledge, even in the long run. 
Note: HC1, HC3, HC4 and HC10: Simon’s contribution (1965) is that the risks inherent in the limitations of the lack of knowledge 
or training of agents and companies to undertake the processes are admitted in this theory of innovation; HC2, HC5 and HC6: In ad-
dition to the limited rationality, the structure of the companies is not always adequate to endure all the costs and risks inherent to the 
innovation process, since even the capture of information and the processing of information are costly acts (Dosi, Fagiolo & Roventini, 
2010); HC7, HC8 and HC9: Assumptions arising from the observation of how the innovation process has developed, according to 
Winter & Nelson (1982)
Source: Prepared based on Simon (1965); Dosi, Fagiolo & Roventini (2010) and Winter & Nelson (1982)
4. Final Considerations and Notes
This paper aimed to analyze the Theory of Innova-
tion, based on the discussion of the macro themes 
suggested, referenced as principles (pillars) of the 
theory of innovation, from the perspective of the 
classic criteria of scientific demarcation, established 
by Popper and Lakatos. It is suggested here that 
the demarcation criteria discussed may facilitate the 
task of defining whether or not a particular subject 
has scientific characteristics.
The following questions may help scholars to re-
discover the construction / transmission of scien-
tific knowledge in the management disciplines that 
make use of this theme, as well as verify how the 
interface operates bewteen this theme and others, 
whose development has occurred based on the 
Schumpeterian theory or the unfolding of the Neo-
schumpterian current: (i) as a precursor theory as 
analyzed in this study, how have its developments 
preserved the traces of identified scientificity? (ii) 
how does the transmission of this knowledge takes 
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place in disciplines predominantly elaborated under 
the perspective of problem solving, which seeks 
achieving efficiency and effectiveness? Still in this 
context, we discuss the problem of the flight from 
‘common sense’, and from the use of the ‘method’ 
as a resource for building scientific knowledge with 
rigor, be it as regards the tests by which the theories 
must pass to assure its robustness (Popper, 1975) or 
be it in the prediction of new facts through applied 
research programs (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1979).
From thePopper’s perspective, the use of the hypo-
thetical deductive method could corroborate state-
ments linked to the Schumpeterian and neo-chum-
peterian theory of innovation and reject statements 
related to neoclassical theory. According Popper 
suggests in the continuity of his work, new facts 
are corroborated by the theory of innovation in its 
beginning and during its evolution. Following Pop-
per’s proposal, this theory should be undergo more 
rigorous testing. In this way, and considering the dy-
namicity of the tests in the ‘Popperian´ conception, 
the Schumpeterian and neo-chumpeterian theory 
can still be considered scientific.
Based on Lakatos’ point of view, the theme ad-
dressed here contemplates the characteristics that 
the author uses to conceptualize a progressive re-
search program, which possesses an excess of cor-
roborated contents in relation to the program of 
which the neoclassical theory is inserted. It is also 
added the demosntration of how auxiliary hypoth-
eses, from the writings of Schumpeter, such as the 
role of the state and of large companies expanded 
the explanatory capacity of this program. From this 
perspective, it can be affirmed that the innovation 
research program meets the ‘lakatosian’ criteria of 
scientificity. Subsequently, the neo-schumpeterian 
theory is recognized as a source of new hypotheses. 
The question to be answered refers to (i) considering 
the neo-schumpeterins contributions to the theory 
of innovation as being a new research program. In 
the words of Lakatos (1971, p.117), “if a research 
program progressively explains more facts than a 
rival program, it ‘beats’ the latter, which can then be 
eliminated (or if preferred, archived)”. Based on the 
analysis undertaken, the neo-schumpeterian con-
tributions are understood as a source of expansion 
of the explanatory bases of innovation, its effects 
on the incorporation, and the adaptation of activi-
ties by companies, as well as their unfolding in the 
economic structure, considering for this the tech-
nical and institutional implications on the industrial 
framework of the sector.
Given the above, we suggest that the neo-schum-
peterian current of innovation predicts new facts. 
For example, the competition matter is: for Szm-
recsányi (2009) a central aspect of competition and 
some companies deliberately strive to be leaders in 
technological innovation, whilst others imitate the 
success of the leader; for Winter & Nelson (1982), 
competition is a dynamic process and these choices 
are not given, as much as their consequences are 
unknown, once other factors external to the firm 
(of technical and institutional nature) also interfere 
in the positioning firms will take. The Table 6 below 
summarizes the notes of this essay.
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Table 6. Suggestion of demarcation for the macro themes of innovation based on Schumpeterian theory
Conception of scientificity criterion / 
Author
Neoclassical theory and 
Schumpeterian theory
Schumpeterian theory and neo-
schumpeterian theory
The hypothetical-deductive method proposed 
by falsificationism as a way of generating sci-
entific knowledge involves the identification of 
a problem (to initiate the research), followed by 
the formulation of hypotheses that will be tested. 
In face of a possible rejection, a new theory will 
emerge (the theory’s ability to be refuted or em-
pirically tested) (Popper, 1975)
Considering the sophisticated falsificationism, it 
can be said that - for the conditions of the time 
- neoclassical theory was empirically distorted 
and replaced by Schumpeter’s theory of innova-
tion. Although this falsification did not imply in 
its complete rejection (since it serves as refer-
ence for innumerable other themes of research), 
innovation in the Schumpeterian perspective 
became the predominant theory in the theme of 
innovation.
Still considering the sophisticated falsification-
ism, it can be affirmed that the neo-schumpete-
rian theory, based on the contributions of Winter 
and Nelson (1982), and Dosi (2006), presented 
excess of empirical content in relation to the 
findings of Schumpeter, especially with respect 
to the technological change as a determinant 
force in the formation of economic transforma-
tion patterns; routines as recurrent patterns of 
behavior subject to change in the face of context 
variations; and the recognition of socio-institu-
tional influences as facilitating forces or even 
hindering certain processes of technological and 
structural change.
 A theory to be considered as scientific must be 
contained in Research Programmes, which are 
structures that guide future research (Lakatos & 
Musgrave, 1979)
Both the neoclassical (micro and macroeco-
nomic) theory of development and the theory 
that replaces it (the theory of innovation), are 
part of research programmes, supported by a 
set of auxiliary hypotheses. In the case of the 
theory of innovation, the label of belonging to a 
progressive research program is also attributed, 
and the inclusion of new hypotheses, from later 
writings of Schumpeter, helped in the predic-
tion of new facts. In this case, it’s stand out 
the recognition of technological innovation as 
endogenous, capable of being conceived by the 
company itself.
We can affirm that the neo-schumpeterian the-
ory of innovation replaced - without necessarily 
contradicting - some of the protective hypoth-
eses of the Schumpeterian research program 
from, among other facts, the inclusion of the 
impact of technical and institutional changes 
at the core of the economic analysis. The ex-
pansion of its explanatory bases (elucidating 
new facts) is thus supported, recognizing: the 
impacts of technological change on industrial 
structures; the effects of uncertainty in compa-
nies´ decision-making as regards innovation; 
the mechanisms of dynamic adjustment result-
ing from technical and institutional changes; the 
importance of private ownership of innovative 
activities; and the use of technological opportu-
nities by companies.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
From the analysis made on this subarea of Admin-
istration, it is possible to credit scientificity to the 
innovation theme, by the analisys of its beginnings 
starting with the neoclassical theory, followed by the 
Schumpeterian theory, and finally with the neo-
schumpeterian theory. The initial steps of the theory 
reproduced here illustrate part of Popper’s writings 
on sophisticated falsificationism and of Lakatos’ writ-
ings on the competition of research programmes, as 
well as their structure of hypotheses. 
Considering, therefore, the scientific demarcation 
criteria used, it is verified that the pillars of the The-
ory of Innovation studied have the following charac-
teristics: (a) observation and test (in a trial and error 
model) do not generate knowledge in the field of in-
novation; (B) the tests and observations are evaluat-
ed in the light of theories, so that - at the beginning 
of the research - they are already impregnated by 
theory; (C) there being no observation without theo-
ry, the impartiality of the researcher on this subject 
cannot be achieved; (D) confirmation of the scien-
tificity of innovation theories is always provisional 
and subject to reformulation; (E) the substitution of 
one theory for another, or one research program 
for another, implies recognizing, for example, that 
neoclassical theory explains less than the Schum-
peterian theory and that it in turn explains less and 
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predicts less than neo-schumpeterian theory. The 
fact that the Theory guides the entire process of 
seeking knowledge in this area does not contradict 
the fact that the results are scientific. This is a vital 
feature of the hypothetical-deductive method, fol-
lowed by practically all fields of knowledge. Go to 
the field without a theory is something common to 
researchers since Induction has fallen into disuse in 
the scientific world. However, this predisposes the 
researcher to a greater need for attention so that 
he does not go to the field simply with the task of 
confirming the Theory studied, once the attempt of 
falsification proposed by Popper (1975), the objec-
tive is exactly the opposite.
Another necessary point is the need to consider 
the historical perspective of the trajectories of each 
theory / research program and the lens by which it 
is being evaluated. Such an observation is illustrated 
with Lowenberg (1989), who defended neoclassical 
economics as pertaining to a progressive research 
program when compared to Marxism and Institu-
tionalism, because the latter theoretical currents do 
not have its explanatory power, nor do they predict 
new facts.
In general, this study was not intended as a final 
scientific answer to the analysis on the scientificity 
of these theories, but to arouse the debate about 
the construction of scientific knowledge and its de-
marcation criteria in this subarea of Administration, 
recognizing that there is a multiplicity of perspec-
tives to evaluate the subject, and that they may all 
be provisional. Hands (1985, p. 83) had already 
recognized, for example, the problems arising from 
the use of Popper’s unique contributions to the field 
of economics when he asserted:
In this literature, there seem to be two fundamen-
tal points of agreement about Popper. First, most 
economists take Popper’s falsificationist method of 
bold conjecture and severe test to be the correct 
characterization of scientific conduct in the physical 
sciences. Second, most economists admit that eco-
nomic theory fails miserably when judged by these 
same falsificationist standards.
As limitations of this research, it is worth noting that 
the analysis is anchored on the classical theoretical 
currents of Innovation Theory: Neoclassical Theo-
ry, Schumpeterian Theory and Neo-Schumpeterian 
Theory. However, new strands are being detected, 
which makes it important to study how these con-
temporary trends have been evolving and have been 
impacting Innovation Theories, from the perspec-
tive of the classic criteria of scientific demarcation. 
Thus, as a proposal for future research, we suggest 
the continuation of this research and the examina-
tion of new researches and models in the area of 
contemporary innovation, which demonstrate evo-
lutions in Neo-Scumpeterian Theory thinking, as 
the paradigm of Open innovation, for example, 
without renouncing the rigor imposed by the hypo-
thetical-deductive method and by investigating the 
prediction of new facts.
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